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Executive Summary
Tariff escalation, a common practice in inter­
national commodity trade, refers to a situation 
where tariffs are zero or low on primary products 
and increase, or escalate, as products undergo 
processing. It causes the price of value-added 
imports relative to raw products to increase, 
decreasing the demand for processed products in 
the importing country. Through tariff escalation, 
one country can effectively protect its domestic 
processing industries while limiting the scope of 
trade-related industrialization in foreign countries.
Tariff escalation significantly impedes market 
access for developing countries, particularly in 
agricultural trade. Higher tariffs for more- 
processed agricultural products have the potential 
to depress value-added activities and obstruct 
export diversification in agricultural exporting 
countries. In addition, tariff escalation is perceived 
as a source of environmental damage to export­
ing countries because excessive reliance on 
primary product exports can lead to depletion of 
natural resources and disturb the ecological 
balance.
Although the importance that developing coun­
tries attach to reducing tariff escalation is widely 
recognized, little progress has been made in this 
area. The structure of escalated tariffs in world 
trade is caused and maintained by the rent- 
seeking behavior of economic agents and the 
resulting political economy of trade policies in 
developed countries. Food-processing industries 
in developed countries are proponents and bene­
ficiaries of escalated tariffs. As agricultural com­
modity chains, particularly those of high-value 
crops and processed products, become 
increasingly dominated by a few giant multi­
national enterprises, industry's incentives and 
ability to maintain tariff escalation grow stronger. 
Developing countries and consumers in developed 
countries are the losers from tariff escalation, but 
they lack the political power to change the 
existing regime.
Reducing tariff escalation is an important issue in 
the ongoing World Trade Organization [WTO] 
negotiations on agriculture. Recognizing that 
tariff escalation is widespread in the post-
Uruguay Round period, many negotiating pro­
posals have called for eliminating or reducing 
tariff escalation as an explicit goal within the 
market access pillar of the Doha Round negotia­
tions. Studies have also shown that these pro­
posals offer options conducive to further reduc­
tion in tariff escalation. A few technical problems 
may arise, however, and special consideration 
must be given to the least-developed countries 
[LDCs] to prevent erosion of their preferential 
margins.
The formation of a coalition of interests between 
the South and the North could make an agree­
ment to further reduce tariff escalation more 
politically feasible. Furthermore, strategies aimed 
at reducing tariff escalation should be accom­
panied by other domestic and trade policies 
designed to enhance the internal capacity of 
developing countries. Sometimes these policies 
will involve financial and technical assistance from 
developed countries.
Your assignment is to recommend to the WTO a 
change in trade policy measures that would allow 
tariff escalation to be reduced and eventually 
eliminated.
Background
Tariff escalation refers to the situation where 
tariffs are zero or low on primary products and 
increase, or escalate, as products undergo 
processing.1 *A common practice in international 
commodity trade, tariff escalation causes the 
price of value-added imports relative to raw 
products to increase, decreasing the demand for 
processed products in the importing country. 
Through tariff escalation, one country can effec­
tively protect its domestic processing industries 
while limiting the scope of trade-related indus­
trialization in foreign countries.
i The opposite may occur when tariffs are higher on
raw materials than on processed products, a situation 
known as tariff de-escalation.
Tariff escalation significantly impedes market 
access for developing countries, particularly in 
agricultural trade. Fully processed, manufactured 
agricultural products are usually subject to much 
higher tariffs than unprocessed products in 
developed countries. For example, average tariffs 
on processed food are as much as 13 times higher 
than those on unprocessed products in Canada. 
In the European Union [EU], 30 percent of all 
peak tariffs protect the agricultural processing 
industry. These tariffs range from 12 to 100 
percent, affecting sugar-based products, cereals, 
and canned fruits. The situation is similar in the 
United States, where the agricultural processing 
industry accounts for one-sixth of all peak tariffs. 
Forty percent of all Japanese peak tariffs protect 
the food industry and affect a wide range of 
products from cocoa powder and chocolate to 
canned meat and fruit juices.
The existence of tariff escalation prohibits 
processed agricultural products from entering 
developed-country markets, hindering expansion 
of agricultural processing industries and export- 
led development in developing countries.2 In addi­
tion, tariff escalation is perceived as a source of 
damage to the environment and an obstacle to 
sustainability in developing countries [OECD 
1996; Hecht 1997], Because of tariff escalation, 
developing countries are often trapped as raw 
material providers, with often harmful conse­
quences for the environment. For example, exces­
sive reliance on primary product exports is likely 
to cause depletion of natural resources and dis­
turb the ecological balance of the country. In 
addition, the slower rate of income growth that 
results from deteriorating terms of trade for raw 
materials and overexploitation of resources leaves 
fewer resources available for efficient environ­
mental management in exporting countries.
Although the importance that developing coun­
tries attach to reducing tariff escalation is widely 
recognized, little progress has been made in this 
area. The WTO Uruguay Round [UR] made some 
contributions toward resolving this issue, but the 
practice of tariff escalation persists and has
2 It should be noted that tariff escalation also exists in 
developing countries. To the extent that agricultural 
trade between developing countries is expanding, 
reduction of tariff escalation within developing coun­
tries has become an increasingly important issue.
become one of the most debated issues in the 
current multilateral trade negotiations. For 
instance, in the beginning of the Doha Round, 13 
out of the 45 country negotiating proposals 
called for substantial reduction in tariff escalation, 
particularly in the developed-country markets. 
These proposals considered tariff escalation a key 
market access problem faced by commodity 
exporters and argued that it should be eliminated 
to help place agricultural products on the same 
footing as other products in the international 
trading system. The need to further reduce tariff 
escalation was again emphasized in the modalities 
of the July Package of 2004 [WT/L/579], the 
Hong Kong Declaration of December 2005 
[WT/MIN[05]/DEC], and more recently 
Falconer's proposal [TN/AG/W /4],
Measuring Tariff Escalation
Tariff escalation can be measured either as 
"nominal tariff escalation" or as "effective rate of 
protection." Nominal tariff escalation [NTE] is 
measured as the tariff wedge [TW], which is the 
difference between the tariff imposed on the 
processed output commodity and the tariff 
imposed on the input commodity [all in ad 
valorem terms].3 The effective rate of protection 
[ERP] measures the effects of tariff structure on 
the value added of the processed commodity. It is 
defined as the percentage increase in value added 
between trade with tariffs and free trade. 
Numerically, ERP is equal to the difference 
between value added expressed in domestic prices 
[that is, prices including tariffs] and that 
expressed in world market prices [that is, free 
trade prices], divided by the value added at world 
market prices.
Both the ERP and the TW may be positive, 
denoting the presence of tariff escalation; nega­
tive, denoting the presence of tariff de-escalation; 
or zero, denoting the neutrality of the tariff 
structure. Although the ERP is a reliable indicator 
of the extent of protection provided to down­
stream industries through tariff escalation, it is 
difficult to calculate because it requires not only 
data on tariffs, but also detailed and accurate data 
on prices, inputs, and technical coefficients—that 
is, data from input-output matrices that generally
3 An ad valorem tariff is a fixed-percentage duty 
assessed on the value of imports.
are not available. To overcome the difficulties 
related to estimating the ERP, the TW approach 
can be used, but not without important limita­
tions. First, nominal tariffs wedges do not fully 
represent the protection level created by the 
tariff structure. Second, since tariff wedges do 
not take into account the value added, they can­
not be compared across commodities. Third, the 
concept of tariff wedges can hardly be applied to 
processing relationships with multiple inputs or 
multiple outputs. Therefore, whatever the method 
used in this exercise, the results should be 
interpreted with caution.
Tariff Escalation and World Agricultural 
T rude
Studies have shown that growth in global agricul­
tural trade in recent decades has shifted more to 
processed products relative to raw materials 
(FAO 2004], Exports of processed agricultural 
commodities generate more income and employ­
ment opportunities through increased volume of 
trade, better prices, and more value-added activi­
ties related to the products and thus contribute 
significantly to economic growth in exporting 
countries. Tariff escalation and other trade 
barriers, however, often keep developing coun­
tries from benefiting from this trend and force 
them to continue to be providers of raw 
products. To give some indication of the extent 
of tariff escalation and how it has affected agricul­
tural trade, Table 1 shows various processing 
stages for a number of commodity groups in 
different countries and regions and gives the 
corresponding tariffs and trade values.4
A number of important features emerge from 
Table 1. First, tariffs are often higher on fully 
processed products than on semiprocessed or 
primary products in the selected countries, 
especially the Quad countries [Canada, the EU, 
Japan, and the United States], Tariff escalation is 
most pronounced for cocoa and coffee, two 
crops of special export interest to many poor 
developing countries. Correspondingly, the
4 For simplicity, Table 1 uses the WTO bound tariff 
rates. Alternatively, applied tariff rates can be used. 
Elamin and Khaira [2004] have shown that the degree 
of tariff escalation is lower in the case of applied than 
bound tariffs, particularly when tariff preferences are 
taken into account.
export shares of developing countries for the two 
products decline with processing stages. For 
example, developing countries dominate the 
world market for cocoa beans and green coffee, 
but their exports of the finished products— 
chocolate and roasted coffee—account for only 8 
and 9 percent of their respective export market 
values.
Second, tariffs in some processing chains do not 
increase and may even decline with additional 
processing. This pattern of tariff de-escalation 
may be tied to the level of support provided by 
farm programs, which, to be effective, might 
require high border protection on primary 
products, such as sugar and tobacco. Inter­
estingly, however, tariff de-escalation in these 
commodities is not necessarily associated with 
increased market shares of more-processed com­
modities from developing countries. For example, 
the market shares of final products of sugar and 
tobacco from developing countries dropped even 
though tariffs for sugar confectionery and cigars 
are less than those for raw sugar and tobacco 
leaves. Thus other factors beyond tariffs signifi­
cantly limit the ability of developing countries to 
expand exports of processed products. These 
factors include high transport costs and the 
ability of firms, especially the multinationals, to 
exercise monopoly power [Yeats 1984],
Reducing tariff escalation may benefit developing 
countries by permitting increased market access 
for some of their processed agricultural products. 
Several studies have shown this effect. For exam­
ple, Elamin and Khaira [2004] use the Agricul­
tural Trade Policy Simulation Model [ATPSM] of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD]-Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO] to 
simulate the effects of changes in tariff escalation, 
under the Harbinson proposal, on selected 
processed products. Their results are shown in 
Table 2. Elamin and Khaira's study included only a 
few processed products, namely roasted coffee, 
cocoa butter, cocoa powder, chocolate, and vege­
table oils. Apart from oilseeds, existing tariffs on 
primary and processed forms of these products 
show a clear pattern of escalation. The simulation 
results based on this limited set of products show 
that reduced tariff wedges [including negative 
wedges] under Harbinson lead to slightly 
increased export values for all countries. Gains in
exports are relatively higher for developing coun­
tries and LDCs than for developed countries 
[Table 2], Because the Harbinson proposal offers 
only limited tariff reduction, it is expected that 
trade in processed products would increase even 
more if tariff escalation were further reduced.
Policy Issues
Primary or Value-added Production?
Over the past 20 years, world trade in processed 
agricultural products has increased significantly 
from an annual average of US$150 billion during 
1981-1990 to more than US$300 billion during 
1991-2000. Although some developing countries 
have benefited from this trend, developed coun­
tries have captured the bulk of the rapidly 
growing trade in this sector. Between 1981 and 
2000, developed countries accounted for more 
than 70 percent of the world's processed agricul­
tural product exports [Table 3], The share of 
developing countries fell from 27 percent in 1981— 
1990 to 25 percent in 1991-2000. For LDCs as a 
group, the share in processed agricultural exports 
fell from a negligible 0.7 percent to 0.3 percent 
over the same period. The significance of 
developing countries as primary producers has 
also decreased in the past decade.
The relatively low shares of developing countries 
in world processed agricultural exports have been 
attributed to several factors. Apart from export­
ing countries' domestic capacity constraints and 
other trade barriers, tariff escalation by importing 
countries is often considered the major market 
access barrier limiting developing countries' 
ability to expand exports of their processed 
products. If the current world tariff regime pers­
ists, dependence on exports of primary agricul­
tural commodities will continue to be a 
prominent feature in many developing countries.
It can be argued that some developing countries 
have a comparative advantage in primary produc­
tion and export and that capturing this compara­
tive advantage can have a positive impact on their 
economies. Important questions arise, however, 
about whether primary agriculture will be a sus­
tainable development strategy for them for the 
future. First, there is little value addition in 
producing and exporting primary products,
whose terms of trade have been in constant 
decline in recent decades. Trade growth in pri­
mary products has also been sluggish, averaging 
only 3.3 percent a year.5 And even this slow 
growth is distributed unevenly among countries. 
Therefore, if most of the economic activity of a 
country is centered on the primary sector, 
growth would be too slow for the country to 
achieve its development goals. Second, the 
sources of some raw materials are bound to be 
exhausted sooner or later, and if a country fails 
to develop a strong manufacturing base, natural 
resources will inevitably be depleted. Further­
more, dependence on raw material exports often 
puts a country at the mercy of unpredictable 
climatic and world market conditions. The situa­
tion is exacerbated by the fact that commodity 
prices are often depressed by developed countries 
as a result of their high agricultural subsidies.
Why Docs Tariff Escalation Persist?
Although tariff escalation is a significant 
impediment to world trade, it is difficult to 
eliminate because of the rent-seeking behavior of 
economic agents and the resulting political 
economy of trade policies. From an economic 
standpoint, rent seeking is the process by which 
an individual, organization, or firm seeks to gain 
by manipulating the economic and political 
environment. Unlike profit seeking, rent seeking 
generally implies the extraction of uncompensated 
value from others without taking actions that 
improve productivity. For example, rent seeking 
may consist of imposing regulations or other 
government decisions that may affect other 
economic agents.
5 Slow growth in primary commodity trade is due to 
the low income elasticity of demand for primary 
products and their decreasing intensity of use in 
economic activities. Studies have also shown that 
changes in the organizational structure of commodity 
markets are important. For example, the high costs 
associated with processing, packaging, advertising, 
marketing, and distribution mean that the cost of pri­
mary commodities as a share of the processed product 
price is usually small.
Table 1: Ta riff Escalation a nd  A n n u a l A  verage G lo b a l E x p o rt Value, Selected C ountries and A g ric u ltu ra l Products, 2 0 0 0 —2 0 0 2 _______
All developing-country
______________________Average bound tariffs (% ]______________________ ____________ exports_______
Value
Primary, intermediate, and 
final products Australia Canada European Union-15 japan United States
Global exports 
[million US$]
(million
US$] Market share (% ]
Cocoa
Cocoa beans 1 0 0 0 0 8,380 8,084 96
Cocoa paste 0 0 10 8 0 838 440 52
Cocoa butter 0 0 8 0 0 4,397 1,887 43
Cocoa powder 9 6 27 19 16 620 156 25
Chocolate and products 17 57 18 21 15 4,355 361 8
Coffee
Coffee: not roasted 1 0 4 0 0 14,213 13,592 96
Coffee: roasted 0 0 8 12 0 1,843 164 9
Coffee mixtures and extracts 1 1 12 39 10 2,638 1,084 41
Grains
Grains 1 11 42 133 2 9,356 2,360 25
Grain products 4 11 41 93 8 2,857 399 14
Vegetable oils
Oilseeds 1 0 0 66 16 2,527 883 35
Vegetable oil 4 6 10 7 4 31,018 12,649 41
Beef, pork, and poultry
Meat: fresh or frozen 0 54 40 41 7 12,240 1,817 15
Meat preparations 7 50 37 91 3 1,712 532 31
Sugar
Sugar 12 5 61 198 24 13,840 9,292 67
Sugar confectionery 11 9 20 16 11 4,625 1,255 27
Tobacco
Unmanufactured tobacco 10 10 38 9 60 7,461 3,963 53
Tobacco products 16 4 14 0 46 6,467 898 14
Notes: Calculations are based on W T O  bound tariffs; products [primary, intermediate, and final] are listed for various processing stages [the steps taken to convert a raw material into a finished 
consumer product]; vegetable oils exclude tropical oils [palm, palm kernel, and coconut].
Source: USDA 2006.
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Table 2: Impact o f the Harbinson Proposed on Tariff Wedges and Export J'allies
Product
Base tariff 
wedge ( % )
Tariff wedge Percentage change in export value
under
Harbinson ( % ) W orld
Developed
countries
Developing
countries LDCs
Coffee: green 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1
Coffee: roasted 2.7 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4
Cocoa beans 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Cocoa powder 7.3 4.4 1.4 1.2 1.6 7.3
Cocoa butter -4.7 -S.7 1.1 0.6 1.3 n.a.
Chocolate 24.7 11.0 6.S 6.3 6.8 6.7
Oilseeds 1.8 1.2 2.4 28.1
Vegetable oils -21.3 -8.4 4.6 2.2 5.0 6.1
Source: Elamin and Khaira 2004. 
Note: n.a. indicates not available.
Table 3 : Share in  W o rld  A g ric u ltu ra l E xp o rts [% ]
Prim ary products Processed products
Period Developed Developing LDCs Developed Developing LDCs
1981-1990 66.2 33.8 3.1 73.0 27.0 0.7
1991-2000 67.4 32.6 2.2 75.0 25.0 0.3
Soli i ce: FAO 2004.
Rent seeking is pervasive in the setting of tariff 
regulations through which government protection 
benefits domestic firms. An escalating degree of 
tariff protection allows domestic processing indus­
tries [downstream activities) to compete, often 
unfairly, with foreign exporters. Like many other 
protective policies, tariff escalation reflects the 
underlying structure of political influence within a 
country. The same structure also governs the feasi­
bility of any reforms that may seek to eliminate 
tariff escalation and hence make trade freer. Tariff 
escalation generates substantial benefits [economic 
rent) for industry groups, whose lobbying power is 
perceived as "influential" in the country. Because 
these groups are beneficiaries of the existing tariff 
structure, a reform that will cost them rent losses 
will be politically infeasible.
The elimination of tariff escalation may also be 
hampered by the "free-rider" problem in political 
lobbying. Political interests who are successful in 
lobbying for tariff escalation are typically the 
manufacturing and processing industries because 
the gains are concentrated in relatively few hands
(so they can act collectively) and they are able to 
capture enough of the gains (economic rent) to 
compensate them for the effort they devote to the 
policy-making process. Those who lose from a 
tariff escalation are the consumers of processed 
products. Although these "losers" are much more 
numerous than the "winners," their costs are 
smaller on average and not sufficient to induce 
them to spend resources to lobby their govern­
ment to avoid the tariff escalation. Instead, they 
would prefer someone else to do it for them so 
that they can "free-ride" on the efforts of similarly 
minded individuals. Consequently, the only lobby­
ing pressure typically comes from the industry that 
gains from the tariff, and the government suc­
cumbs to this one-sided pressure.
To Retaliate or Not?
Suppose that developed countries impose escalated 
tariffs on their imports from developing countries. 
The governments of developing countries are 
sometimes forced to retaliate with the same 
escalated tariff structure on their own imports by
political pressure from their own vested interest 
groups, just like the ones that keep tariff escalation 
in place in developed countries. From an economic 
[game theoretic] standpoint, choosing tariff escala­
tion may be the dominant strategy for both 
developing and developed countries. When all 
countries choose this dominant strategy, however, 
a least-efficient outcome occurs [a "lose-lose" situa­
tion], even though this outcome may represent an 
equilibrium [Nash equilibrium].
What if developing countries do not retaliate? The 
move from retaliation to non-retaliation by 
developing countries does not necessarily trigger a 
change in the strategy of developed countries, 
which might gain even more by maintaining tariff 
escalation. This is clearly a "Iose-win" situation 
where developing countries lose and developed 
ones win. The historical evidence suggests that a 
number of developing countries, especially the 
small ones, are indeed pursuing this non-retaliatory 
option—they continue to be primary producers 
and exporters. Some larger developing economies 
that have greater economic power have chosen to 
retaliate by setting their own escalated tariffs. Even 
in this case, developing countries are likely to lose 
because they can hardly impose a credible threat 
(because of their limited import market size], and 
developed countries are keeping their tariff escala­
tion intact.
Is There a Way Out?
The WTO may offer some hope for breaking this 
deadlock. Indeed, the UR of the WTO has made 
substantial progress in reshaping the world tariff 
structure in a direction toward fewer distortions in 
agricultural markets and better market access con­
ditions for developing-country exporters. For 
example, the average tariff cuts are 36 percent for 
developed countries and 24 percent for developing 
countries at the end of their respective UR imple­
mentation periods. The impact of the UR on tariff 
escalation, however, has been much less significant. 
Studies have shown that tariff escalation is still 
widespread in the present world agricultural trading 
system.
One of the most comprehensive analyses of tariff 
escalation was conducted by Lindland [1997], 
covering 226 agricultural commodities in input and 
output pairs in three import markets—the EU, 
Japan, and the United States. The study found that 
although there was a reduction in the bound tariff
wedges between processed and primary products 
following the UR, more than half of the com­
modity pairs examined still had escalating bound 
tariffs after the full implementation of the UR 
commitments. The highest post-UR bound tariff 
escalation was found in the dairy, sugar, fruit, 
tobacco, and hides and skins sectors [Lindland 
1997], Other studies have found similar results. For 
example, Elamin and Khaira [2004] showed that 
tariff escalation persisted after full implementation 
of the UR agreement, and the degree of escalation 
was higher for bound tariffs than applied tariffs. 
UNCTAD [2003] evaluated tariff escalation for 12 
agricultural commodity pairs by averaging nominal 
tariffs for different processing stages in the Quad 
markets. The study found that most of the post- 
UR tariffs escalated from raw to semi-finished 
products and from semi-finished to finished 
products. Earlier studies by USDA (USDA 2001], 
the Swedish Board of Agriculture (Burman et al. 
2001], and the OECD (1996, 1997] also showed 
widespread tariff escalation in agricultural markets 
in both developed and developing countries.
How to Proceed?
Consistent with these studies that showed wide­
spread tariff escalation in the post-UR period, many 
negotiating proposals have called for eliminating or 
reducing tariff escalation as an explicit goal within 
the market access pillar of the Doha Round negoti­
ations. There is little consensus, however, about 
how future reductions should proceed. The official 
text on negotiations, the Hong Kong Declaration 
of December 2005, in its Annex A (para. 17] under 
"other elements" of market access, states as follows: 
"There has been no further material convergence 
on the matters covered by paragraphs 35 and 37 of 
the July 2004 Framework text. The same may be 
said for paragraph 36 on tariff escalation, albeit 
that there is full agreement on the need for this to 
be done, and a genuine recognition of the particu­
lar importance of this for commodities exporters." 
Thus no agreement has so far been reached on 
reducing and eliminating tariff escalation, and the 
official position of the WTO remains, as stated in 
its 2004 Framework, that a formula needs to be 
found.
Despite the lack of an agreement, several tariff­
cutting formulas have been proposed with the aim 
of reducing tariffs, and in particular tariff escala­
tion. Two approaches [and their variants] are 
favored most by WTO member countries—they
are the "Uruguay Round approach" and the 
"harmonizing reduction approach." The Uruguay 
Round approach provides a linear tariff cut—that 
is, tariffs are reduced by the same percentage no 
matter what the starting tariff rate is. Variations are 
allowed for specific products so long as a simple 
average across all products meets the target. The 
rate would be negotiated along with reduction rates 
for export subsidies and domestic support, as well 
as other issues. Supporters say this approach is 
simple and flexible. Critics say it could produce 
insignificant improvement in market access and 
would not deal with tariff peaks and escalation.
The harmonizing reduction approach would 
produce much steeper cuts on higher tariffs. It is a 
nonlinear tariff-cutting approach that would have a 
homogenizing effect on all tariff lines. Supporters 
of the harmonizing approach, those previously 
advocating the "cocktail" approach, say it is needed 
in order to reduce tariff peaks and escalation. 
Critics say this formula is too ambitious, requires 
too much adjustment, and is inequitable because 
countries with lower tariffs would not have to do 
much. Some also argue that the harmonizing 
approach would be too complicated because it 
would require converting specific tariffs into ad 
valorem tariffs. Within the harmonizing approach, 
two types of formulas have been proposed: the 
tiered formulas and the mathematical formulas [for 
example, the Swiss formula]. The tiered formula, 
accepted by many as a general tariff reduction 
method, was proposed in the most recent modality 
by New Zealand Ambassador Crawford Falconer 
[TN/AG/W /4], There is much less agreement, 
however, about which formula to select in terms of 
reducing tariff escalation in particular.
What about LDCs?
LDCs gain access to the markets of developed 
countries, and particularly the EU, essentially 
through preferential agreements. These agreements 
define conditions of preferential access to the 
European market, but they are not subject to 
multilateral international negotiations, which instead 
concern the exchanges governed by the most- 
favored-nation [MFN] regime.6 One of the LDCs'
6 The WTO's most-favored-nation principle means that 
each member treats all the other members equally as 
"most-favored" trading partners. If a member improves 
the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it must
fears concerning WTO negotiations is that their 
advantage could be eroded by tariff cuts on an 
MFN basis.
Tariff escalation is not a real problem for LDCs; 
this group of countries enjoys similar levels of 
preferential access for both primary and processed 
products in developed-country markets.7 A reduc­
tion of tariff escalation on an MFN basis, however, 
will significantly erode their preferential advantages. 
To illustrate, a tariff reduction strategy—for exam­
ple, the Harbinson proposal, a rather moderate 
formula with regard to reduction of tariff escala­
tion^ —can be applied to the EU market.8 The tariff­
cutting results and the implications for the 
preferential margins of the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific [ACP] countries are summarized in Table 4.
Following the Harbinson tariff reduction formula, 
accession to the EU market is considerably 
improved for the Generalized System of 
Preferences beneficiaries [the average tariff is 
reduced from 17.9 percent to 9.0 percent], but at 
the same time the preferential margin for these 
countries is almost nullified [dropping from about 
3 percent to 0.4 percent]. Access to the EU 
market is hardly modified for the ACP countries, 
but they suffer from significant reduction of their 
preferential margin. This margin, which was 15.4 
percent, would drop to 5 percent after implemen­
tation of Harbinson formula.
give the same "best" treatment to all other WTO 
members so that they all remain "most-favored."
7 For example, Chevassus-Lozza and Gallezot [2003] 
show that tariff escalation for various commodities is 
close to zero at all stages of the production process for 
ACP countries.
8 The ACPs include 77 countries in the Africa, 
Caribbean, and Pacific region that benefit from preferen­
tial market access to the EU. in addition, the EU also 
uses a Generalized System of Preferences [GSP], giving 
special and preferential treatment to 178 developing 
countries and territories.
Table 4 : E ffe ct o f  the H arbinson Form ula on M F N  and Preferential Tariffs [% )
Tim e period M FN A C P GSP
Other
preferences
Before Harbinson 20.7 5.3 17.9 2.7
After Harbinson 9.4 4.4 9.0 2.2
Source: Chevassus-Lozza and Gallezot 2003.
Note: M FN  = most favored nation; ACP = Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific; GSP = Generalized System of Preferences.
Based on this analysis, it is evident that any deep 
reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation on an 
MFN basis will affect preferential margins and 
result in substantial preference erosion for the 
LCDs. It will further allow other countries to gain 
part of the LCDs' share in the developed markets 
and therefore lead to stronger competition for 
LDCs. If LDCs must compete directly with other 
developing countries and even developed countries, 
they are poised to lose from the reduction of tariff 
escalation.
Stakeholders
Developed Countries
Tariff escalation can benefit developed countries 
for economic and political reason. First, tariffs 
[including tariff escalation] provide an important 
source of revenue for the government. Escalated 
tariffs in the form of tariff peaks generate high 
marginal revenue for a given import value. Second, 
tariff escalation can be used as a retaliatory tool 
against a tariff structure imposed by a trade 
partner or an act of "dumping" by a foreign firm. 
The latter are called anti-dumping duties.
Third, tariff escalation is part of a "strategic trade 
policy" in some developed countries. This policy 
entails government collusion with industry in 
promoting the sale of processed products by large 
firms in an international oligopoly [or some form 
of imperfectly competitive market where price and 
production follow strategic or game-type behavior]. 
This is particularly true when agricultural 
commodity chains, particularly those of high-value 
crops and processed products, become more 
powerful and are increasingly dominated by a few
multinational enterprises [MNEs], Within this 
context, the food-processing companies, especially 
MNEs, are the clear beneficiaries of an escalated 
tariff structure. For these companies, tariff 
escalation implies advantageously low rates of duty 
on their imported inputs in relation to the 
protection they receive against imported products 
that compete with those they produce.
It is important to note that consumers in 
developed countries are also stakeholders in, and 
apparently losers from, tariff escalation. Higher 
tariffs lead to increased prices for food products 
they purchase and decreased consumer surplus. 
The lost consumer surplus goes partly to producer 
surplus and government tariff revenues and partly 
to deadweight losses.
Developing Countries
Tariff escalation particularly affects the processed- 
food sector in developing countries. High tariffs on 
processed agricultural products prevent their 
export and create a disincentive for agricultural 
processing. The impact of tariff escalation on the 
food-processing industry can be amplified to the 
country level. Specifically, tariff escalation limits the 
scope of trade-induced industrialization that can 
occur in developing countries. It prevents devel­
oping countries from moving into higher stages of 
processing and diversifying their exports, hence 
reducing their relative share of final value added 
and their ability to maintain positive trade balances. 
Escalated tariffs shift the economic activity of ex­
porting countries toward primary production and 
away from processing, locking them into volatile 
primary commodity markets that are characterized 
by low and deteriorating world prices—a further 
burden on their balance of payments. Tariff
escalation can also lead to excessive exploitation of 
natural resources and thus damage the environment 
in these countries. The removal of escalating tariffs 
would enable developing countries to develop a 
stronger manufacturing base and thus capture a 
larger share of the final value of export earnings, 
and in turn to generate more employment, invest­
ment opportunities, and sustainable growth.
Least-Developed Countries
A significant share of LDCs' agricultural exports 
are directed to the developed-country markets 
under preferential agreements. A comparison of 
tariff escalation under the different preferential 
schemes in the previous section reveals that tariff 
escalation is not a severe problem for the LDCs. 
Any reduction of tariff escalation on an MFN 
basis, however, will result in substantial preference 
erosion for the LDCs. It will further allow other 
countries to gain part of the LDCs' share in the 
developed-country markets, and therefore LDCs 
will face stronger competition.
Policy Options
Trade Negotiations
Multilateral trade negotiations through the WTO 
may be an option conducive to further reduction
of tariff escalation, although their effectiveness has 
been questioned on various occasions since the UR. 
The fact is, however, that even though tariff escala­
tion persisted after the UR, the problem has been 
less serious than it was before the UR. Lindland 
[1997] showed that the average post-UR nominal 
[bound] tariff wedge [for all commodities with posi­
tive tariff wedges] was 17 percent—6 percent less 
than the base year average of 23 percent. Table 5 
shows the five commodities with highest post-UR 
tariff escalation rates and compares them with cor­
responding base year numbers. In all cases tariff 
escalation measured by tariff wedges decreased 
following the UR. To complement these results, 
studies on post-UR proposals have shown that 
further reduction in tariff escalation can be 
expected as a result of current trade negotiations. 
For example, Sharma [2006] finds that tariff escala­
tion can be effectively reduced from 25 percent in 
the base period to 4, 6, and 7 percent [unweighted 
averages] following the proposals by the United 
States, Group of 20, and the EU, respectively, at 
the Doha Round.
Table 5 : B ound  T a riff Escalation fo r  Selected Com m odities
C ountry  or region/product
Tariff wedges ( % )
Base tariffs U R  bound tariffs
European Union
Fruit products 102.5 84.8
Sugar products and sweeteners 39.8 37.2
Dairy and egg products 51.6 34.4
Root and tuber products 31.0 19.8
Tobacco and pyrethrum 37.3 14.1
Japan
Sugar products and sweeteners 96.9 82.2
Root and tuber products 61.1 50.3
Hides and skins 60.0 30.0
Dairy and egg products 36.9 29.1
United States
Cassava starch 40.1 38.0
Malt of barley 38.1 36.9
Dairy and egg products 39.7 33.6
Sugar products and sweeteners 36.1 31.2
Source: Lindland 1997.
Possible Reduction Methods
On the technical aspects of addressing tariff escala­
tion in the trade negotiations, different tariff­
cutting methods have been proposed. But until 
now, there has been no unanimous support for any 
one method. The first draft of modalities 
[TN/AG/W/I/Rev.l), the Harbinson text of March 
2003, reconciles the two most popular methods— 
the Uruguay Round approach and the harmonizing 
approach. The text relevant to tariff escalation, in 
the paragraph following the tariff reduction for­
mula [para. 8], reads as follows: "In applying this 
formula, where the tariff on a processed product is 
higher than the tariff for the product in its primary 
form, the rate of tariff reduction for the processed 
product shall be equivalent to that for the product 
in its primary form multiplied, at a minimum, by a 
factor of [1.3]." In other words, whenever the for­
mula results in positive tariff escalation, a factor of 
[1.3] will be applied to reduce the gap. This rather 
concrete proposal for reducing tariff escalation was 
not, however, carried forward in the subsequent 
texts because it was found to be "fraught with 
technical problems," most notably the use of a 
single multiple factor [Sharma 2006,16].
Sharma [2006] suggests an alternative idea that 
deviates from negotiating a single adjustment factor 
or a multiple as proposed in the 2003 Harbinson 
text. Sharma argues that agreements on escalated 
tariff-cutting formulas must be reached on two key 
building blocks. First, a list of processed products 
and their corresponding primary products should 
be identified for applying the formula, no matter 
what formula is used. A group of 20-25 processed 
products, about 100 tariff lines, and about 150— 
200 tariff lines for the corresponding primary 
products should be selected for the targeted list. In 
addition, an agreement would be needed on a 
threshold, or a de minimis level, within which to 
contain the tariff escalation for the products identi­
fied. The de minimis level could be, for example, a 
tariff wedge of 5 percentage points between pri­
mary and processed products for developed coun­
tries and 10 percentage points for developing coun­
tries. It would then be relatively straightforward to 
determine the required adjustment factors for tariff 
reduction rates, over and above the formula rates.
Special Considerations for LDCs
Any reduction method should explicitly consider 
the need to preserve the preferential treatment of 
the LDCs. For the LDCs, the real problem is neither
tariff peaks nor tariff escalation, but the erosion of 
preferences following any tariff reduction. In 
general, the outcome from addressing tariff escala­
tion [or tariff reduction in general] for the LDCs 
will be negative, and the anticipated negative effects 
will be greater if more drastic tariff reduction for­
mulas are adopted, including the possibility of 
applying an additional formula to the general one 
to specifically address tariff escalation.
A number of compensatory measures can be 
envisioned that would preserve or even enhance 
LDCs' preferential treatment. First, developed coun­
tries can deepen their preference programs by 
granting the LDCs duty-free and quota-free market 
access to all agricultural products that are covered 
in existing programs. Second, developed countries 
can widen the coverage of preference programs by 
extending the duty-free and quota-free access to all 
agricultural products including those that have not 
been covered in existing programs [that is, 
developing a system similar to EU's Everything But 
Arms initiative]. Third, preferential market access 
for LDC exports can be broadened to include 
advanced developing countries in the group of 
preference-granting countries. Lastly, preference­
granting countries can strengthen existing 
preference programs and new preference initiatives 
by making them permanent and unconditional [for 
example, by applying simpler rules of origin and 
eliminating eligibility conditions other than being 
an LDC],
A North-South Coalition
Welfare could be enhanced if some countries 
(preferably developed countries] make some con­
cessions during multilateral trade negotiations in 
terms of reducing tariff escalation and thereby 
induce others to follow. By reducing their tariff 
escalation, developed countries could both help 
promote processed imports into their markets and 
expand their own exports to other countries. A 
"win-win" situation will result if all countries elimi­
nate tariff escalation. However appealing this situa­
tion may be, political lobbying by selected groups 
within developed countries may derail efforts to 
reduce tariff escalation. In this case, a coalition of 
political interests could provide a necessary and 
politically proactive way out.
Specifically, the strategy would rely on forming and 
strengthening a coalition of interests between 
deveioping-country producers (of processed goods,
which are labor intensive], and developed-country 
consumers. The thread connecting such a coalition 
is civil society, particularly the consumer and 
environmental organizations of developed as well as 
developing countries. With this coalition, it would 
be politically feasible for developed countries' 
governments to remove tariff escalation and thus 
create the basis for a win-win situation.
Domestic Capacity Building
Besides tariff escalation, internal supply constraints 
have also limited the ability of developing countries 
to take advantage of trading opportunities in 
processed agricultural products. These constraints 
include weak technology; insufficient transport, 
storage, and marketing infrastructure; inadequate 
legal and regulatory arrangements; and policy- 
induced disadvantages resulting from trade and 
macroeconomic policies that are biased against 
agriculture and exports. Therefore, strategies aimed 
at reducing tariff escalation should be accompanied 
by other domestic and trade policies designed to 
enhance the internal capacity of developing coun­
tries. Sometimes these policies will require inter­
national cooperation and financial and technical 
assistance from developed countries.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend to the WTO a 
change in trade policy measures that would allow 
tariff escalation to be reduced and eventually 
eliminated.
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